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ANOTHER CHAPTER IN FIRST AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE:
THE RIGHT To EXCLUDE BASED ON SEXUAL OR1ENTATION
Hillel R. Smith*
I. INTRODUCTION
Historically, the First Amendment has been regarded as a fundamental and
essential right, preserving a person's liberty to speak and express herself without
the threat of criminal punishment, censorship, or undue abridgement over the
content of her message.' Indispensable to the First Amendment has been the
right to associate with others to engage in protected expression, and to decide
with whom one wishes to join in that pursuit, free from state interference.2 This
guarantee has become popularly known as the freedom of association and has
been recognized by the courts as an equally important constitutional right.'
The First Amendment, however, is not absolute, particularly in the context of
associational rights.' The state has robustly challenged through public accommo-
dation statutes and anti-discrimination laws the right of people, especially in the
guise of private organizations, to decide without impediment who may join them
for expressive activities and private relationships.' An enormous tension has
arisen between the individual's right to declare with whom she desires to associ-
ate and not to associate, and the compelling state interest to bestow upon every
person the rights to equal benefit and enjoyment in a society unencumbered by
prejudice and hatred." Recently, this remarkable tension has sparked great con-
troversy over the First Amendment rights of one such organization, the Boy
Scouts of America.7 A respected organization rich in tradition, the Boy Scouts
has claimed an exclusive right to deny membership on the basis of sexual orien-
tation.8 A firestorm of debate has led to much litigation, and now finds itself at
the pinnacle of its explosive rise to seek justice-the United States Supreme
Court.
* Assistant District Counsel, Department of Justice, Immigration and Naturalization Service, Miami, Florida;
B.B.A. Belmont University, 1996; J.D. Mississippi College School of law, 2000.
I. The First Amendment provides: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof, or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the peo-
ple peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievance."
2. Ann H. Jameson, Roberts v. United States Jaycees: Discriminatory Membership Policy of a National
Organization Held Not Protected by First Amendment Freedom ofAssociation, 34 CATH. U. L. REv. 1055, 1055
(Summer 1985).
3. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984). See also NAACP v. State of Ala. ex rel.
Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958).
4. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 623.
5. Marissa L. Goodman, A Scout is Morally Straight, Brave, Clean, Trustworthy... And Heterosexual?
Gays in the Boy Scouts ofAmerica, 27 HOFSTtA L. Rev. 825, 826-35 (Summer 1999).
6. Id. at 834-35.
7. Id. at 828.
8. Id.
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II. THE FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION
A. Early Development
The freedom of association is the "right to associate with others in pursuit of a
wide variety of political, social, economic, educational, religious, and cultural
ends."9 It has been intimated that this right is so significant that the freedoms of
speech, religion, assembly, and petitioning the government for the redress of
grievances would not stand alone without a corresponding right to collectively
join together as a group to attain these objectives."0 Without question, the
essence of human nature is to form communities where people can share similar
ideas and beliefs and establish their own identity." Only through the freedom of
association can this sense of identity be preserved.
This right of association, however, did not immediately appear at the forefront
of First Amendment protection. In fact, the First Amendment does not even
specifically allude to any right of association. 2 It was not until 1958 that the
Supreme Court finally recognized it as a First Amendment guarantee in NAACP
v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson.3 The Court declared that the state could not force
the NAACP to disclose the names and addresses of its members." Such disclo-
sure would infringe upon the members' freedom of association, expose them to
various economic harms, physical threats, and public scorn, and affect their abili-
ty to "engage in association for the advancement of beliefs and ideas."'"
Exposing the group to such harm would impose restraints on "[e]ffective advoca-
cy of both public and private points of view, particularly controversial ones,"
which the court unequivocally determined to be "enhanced by group associa-
tion."' 8
After Patterson, the Supreme Court continued to shape the contours of this
fundamental right, identifying the means by which it could be abridged. 7 This
included such governmental acts as exacting penalties or denying certain privi-
leges and benefits to members of a disfavored organization, 8 mandating the dis-
closure of a group's membership lists or a person's association with a group that
is the target of hostility 9 and interfering with the internal organization or essen-
9. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 622.
10. Id.
I1. Goodman, supra note 5, at 833.
12. Jameson, supra note 2, at 1055, 1059-60.
13. NAACP v. State of Ala. ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958).
14. Id.
15. Id. at 460-63. The Court also held that to justify an impairment of this liberty interest, the state had to
establish a sufficient compelling interest to support the restrain on the protected right of association:
16. Id. at 460.
17. Jameson, supra note 2, at 1061-66.
18. Id. at 1061 (citing NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 925 (1982) (imposing liability for
presence at weekly NAACP meetings); Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 175-76 (1972) (denying campus recogni-
tion of student group wishing to form local chapter of a student political organization because its "philosophy
was antithetical to the school's policies")).
19. Jameson, supra note 2, at 1061 (citing Brown v. Socialist Workers '74 Campaign Comm., 459 U.S. 87,
89 (1982) (requiring political candidate to disclose names and addresses of campaign contributions and recipi-
ents of campaign disbursements); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 480 (1960) (requiring teachers to report
every organization they were members of as a condition of employment)).
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tial activities of a group.2" These governmental restraints all had the effect of
impairing the group's ability to express its collective voice." As in Patterson,
these decisions placed the burden on the state to demonstrate a compelling inter-
est that would warrant such intrusive governmental action.2
Ultimately, the Court faced the question whether the freedom to associate nec-
essarily presumed a freedom not to associate, and how this right could be recon-
ciled with social equality.23 In Evans v. Newton, the Court formulated the princi-
ple that, absent state-sponsored inequality, there was a "right of the individual to
pick his own associates so as to express his preferences and dislikes, and to fash-
ion his private life by joining such clubs and groups as he chooses."2' Based on
this principle, the Court declared that a private golf club's ability to restrict mem-
bership based on race was essential to freedom of association." In Moose Lodge
No. 107 v. Irvis, the Court similarly upheld a private club's right to discriminate
on the theory that the grant of a liquor license did not constitute state action to
trigger the shield of equal protection." There was a crucial distinction between
state discriminatory conduct, which was constitutionally prohibited under the
Fourteenth Amendment, and discriminatory action by purely private organiza-
tions, which escaped the grasp of equal protection and was constitutionally pro-
tected by the First Amendment.27
In contrast, the Court in Runyon v. McCrary refused to uphold a private right to
discriminate when challenged by a specific statute whose purpose was to guaran-
tee equal access.28 A private school that denied admission on the basis of race
was sued under section 1981 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, which proscribed
racial discrimination in the making and enforcing of a contract.29 Finding that
the statute's scope extended to racial discrimination by schools, the Court con-
ceded a right among parents to espouse segregation in schools, if that was their
belief." This did not, however, guarantee them a constitutional right to deny
admission based on race. The Court noted that the parents could still promote
their message, even in the absence of a discriminatory policy by the school. 2
The decision illustrated how freedom of association did not necessarily entail a
right to discriminate and to deny equal opportunity to others, especially when
confronted with important legislation.' The effect of such legislation was not to
20. Jameson, supra note 2, at 1061 (citing Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477 (1975) (state attempted to inter-
fere with the internal structure and organizations "of the National Democratic Party by requiring election of cer-
tain delegates to the Democratic Convention)).
21. Jameson, supra note 2, at 1065.
22. Id. at 1060-65.
23. Id. at 1061-66.
24. Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 298 (1966).
25. Id. at 299.
26. Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 177 (1972).
27. Id. at 172.
28. Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 163-76 (1976).
29. Id. at 163-64.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 175-76.
32. Id. at 176.
33. Id.
20001
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impair the group's right to continue to advocate its view.3' This transition marked
the beginning of the tension between association and equality, and paved the way
for a landmark decision.
B. The Modern Approach
The ever-growing tension between the fundamental rights of equality and asso-
ciation necessitated a deeper analysis of the scope of the freedom of association.
In the early 1980s, another discriminatory policy led to a crucial Supreme Court
decision.35 The United States Jaycees was a non-profit membership corporation
that expressly excluded women from regular membership and was limited to men
between the ages of eighteen and thirty-five. 6 Those who were not eligible for
regular membership, particularly women and older men, could only obtain asso-
ciate membership, which did not carry with it the right to vote, hold a local or
national office, or take part in leadership training and awards programs.37 When
the Minneapolis and St. Paul chapters of the Jaycees violated the organization's
bylaws by including women as regular members, the president threatened to
revoke their charters.' In due course, the two chapters brought discrimination
charges under the Minnesota Human Rights Act, and the Jaycees responded by
commencing an action challenging the Act as violative of, among other things,
its freedom of association.
3 9
In Roberts v. United States Jaycees, the Supreme Court held that the Jaycees'
freedom of association would not be violated if it were required to admit women
as regular members. 0 It found that the freedom of association encompassed a
right of intimate association and a right of expressive association." Intimate
association pertained to the freedom of choosing and entering into highly person-
al and intimate relationships without intrusion by the state.' This protected the
individual's right to affiliate herself with another person in order to define her
identity and share ideas, beliefs, and other personal aspects.'3 The Court said
that such associations were characterized by "relative smallness, a high degree of
selectivity in decisions to begin and maintain the affiliation, and seclusion from
others in critical aspects of the relationship."" Expressive association was the
freedom to join with others in a group effort to engage in activities that were pro-
tected by the First Amendment.'" The Court stated, however, that an infringe-
ment on this right could be "justified by regulations adopted to serve compelling
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609,613 (1984).
37. Id.
38. Id. at 614.
39. Id. at 614-15.
40. Id. at 621-29.
41. Id. at 617-18.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 618-19.
44. Id. at 620.
45. Id. at 618, 622-23.
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state interests, unrelated to the suppression of ideas, that cannot be achieved
through means significantly less restrictive of associational freedoms."' 6
The Court found that the Jaycees was not protected by a right of intimate asso-
ciation because its local chapters were large and unselective groups, which aside
from age and sex, did not use any special criteria for admitting its applicants."7
Furthermore, the chapters went out of their way to actively recruit new
members.'8 Regular members often participated with women in various meet-
ings, projects, and social functions, negating any sign of seclusion." On the
other hand, the Court conceded that by requiring the Jaycees to admit women, the
statute abridged its right of expressive association by forcing the group to accept
members it did not wish to associate with, thus "impair[ing] the ability of the
original members to express only those views that brought them together."'
Nevertheless, the Court concluded that such an infringement was warranted by
Minnesota's compelling interest in eliminating sex discrimination and serious
social and personal harm."1 In addition, the statute did not relate to expression in
any way, but rather to equal access.52 There was no indication, aside from stereo-
typical notions about women, that admitting them as regular members would
have the effect of changing the group's views or philosophy which had nothing to
do with gender.'
The articulation established by Jaycees was followed by the Court in two sub-
sequent decisions. In Board of Directors of Rotary International v. Rotary Club
of Duarte, the Court rejected Rotary International's contention that forcing its
private clubs to admit women would interfere with its members' freedom of asso-
ciation."' The variation in club size from less than twenty to over 900 members,
the policy of reaching out to business and professional leaders from all occupa-
tions in order to reflect a diverse community of interests, and the involvement of
business associates and competitors, including women, in the organization's reg-
ular activities, did not depict "the kind of intimate or private relation that war-
rants constitutional protection."55 Similarly, accepting women as regular mem-
bers would not change its message of "humanitarian service, high ethical stan-
dards in all vocations, good will, and peace," nor would it prevent it from contin-
uing to open its doors to leading professionals from different communities,
which positively included women." Moreover, any impediment on expressive
association was warranted by the legitimate interest in assuring equal access to
women.
46. Id. at 623.
47. Id. at 621.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 623.
51. Id. at 623-25.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 623-28.
54. Board of Dirs. of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537, 545-50 (1987).
55. Id. at 546-47.
56. Id. at 548-49.
57. Id. at 549.
2000)
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A year later, the Court declined to sustain a First Amendment challenge against
a New York anti-discrimination statute by a conglomerate of private clubs."
Each club had a minimum of 400 members, with some involving nonmembers in
meetings, commercial transactions and business relationships.', The statute did
not require the clubs "to abandon or alter" any protected activities, such as the
views they wished to convey."0
III. THE Boy SCOUTS OF AMERICA
The Boy Scouts of America is another organization that has maintained the
freedom to decide without interference to whom it would open or close its doors
of membership.61 In the past, the Boy Scouts had declared a right to exclude
individuals based on religion and sex.62 The Boy Scouts also held as embedded
in its tradition the right to exclude homosexuals.' Two interesting state cases
warrant examination, both of which illustrate the tension between association
and equality, and reflect the difficulty in reaching a consistent solution.
A. Dale v. Boy Scouts of America
The Boy Scouts has been a part of American tradition since the start of the
twentieth century.' This organization seeks a diverse group of youths and adults
to join together in a mission "to serve others by helping to instill values in young
people and, in other ways, to prepare them to make ethical choices, over their
lifetime in achieving their full potential."6 The guiding principles that propel
this mission are found in the Scout Oath, which provides: "On my honor I will
do my best To do my duty to God and my country and to obey the Scout Law; To
help other people at all times; To keep myself physically strong, mentally awake,
and morally straight."' The Scout Law also frames the values to which a scout
must adhere, including, among other things, an aspiration to be "clean."6
James Dale had been a member of the Boy Scouts since he was eight.' Over
the years, Dale earned great respect for his achievements and leadership." He
ultimately sought adult membership, only to be denied when it became public
knowledge that he was gay." Dale brought an action alleging that the Boy
58. New York State Club Ass'n, Inc. v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1988) (quoting Board of Dirs.
of Rotary Int'l, 481 U.S. at 548).
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Goodman, supra note 5, at 827.
62. Id. at 851-53 (citing Yeaw v. Boy Scouts of Am., 64 Cal. Rptr. 2d 85, 85-87 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997); Welsh
v. Boy Scout of Am., 993 F.2d 1267, 1268 (7th Cir. 1993)).
63. Goodman, supra note 5, at 827-28, 851-55.
64. Id.
65. Dale v. Boy Scouts of Am., 734 A.2d 1196, 1200-02 (N.J. 1999) (quoting Boy Scout Mission Statement).
66. Dale 734 A.2d at 1202 (quoting ROBERT C. BiRKBY, THE BoY SCOUr HANDBOOK 549 (10th ed. 1990)).
67. Dale, 734 A.2d at 1202.
68. Id. at 1204.
69. Id.
70. Id.
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Scouts' decision was in violation of the New Jersey Law Against
Discrimination." In response, the Boy Scouts claimed that under its Oath and
Law, requiring a scout to be "morally straight" and "clean," it had the duty and
constitutional right to exclude homosexuals from membership.72 The trial court
agreed, finding this implicit in the Boy Scouts' policy, which revealed a moral
position contrary to homosexuality. 3 The Court held that to require Dale to be
accepted as an adult member would violate the Boy Scouts' freedom of expres-
sive association."' The Appellate Division disagreed.7" It found no constitutional
protection, based on the Boy Scouts' enormous size, its active recruitment policy,
and its involvement with school and other public activities.75 Additionally, it did
not find that enforcing the statute would affect the Boy Scouts' ability to carry
forth its message, which was to "instill values in young people," and "not to con-
demn homosexuality.""
The New Jersey Supreme Court first held that the anti-discrimination law
applied to the Boy Scouts.7" The statute, the goal of which was to extirpate "the
cancer of discrimination,"7 " expressly granted everyone an opportunity "to obtain
all the accommodations, advantages, facilities, and privileges of any place of
public accommodation," without being subjected to discrimination on the basis
of "affectional or sexual orientation."' The court found that the Boy Scouts was
a place of public accommodation within the meaning of the statute, because it
reached out to members of the public to join its organization through solicitation
activities in various places, and carried forth a close relationship with govern-
mental entities.8 By denying Dale the "privilege" and "advantage" of an assis-
tant scoutmaster position on the basis of his homosexuality, the Boy Scouts clear-
ly violated the statute.
8 2
The court next focused on the critical First Amendment issue of whether apply-
ing the statute to the Boy Scouts' discriminatory policy based on sexual orienta-
tion transgressed its freedom of association. With little difficulty, the court
found that the Boy Scouts' freedom of intimate association was not in jeopardy.8
The size of the local troop was quite large, often ranging between fifteen and
thirty members and a number of adult leaders.8 The troop did not appear to be
selective in membership, since any boy between the ages of eleven and seventeen
71. Id.
72. Id. at 1205-06 (citing Dale v. Boy Scouts of Am., No. MON-C-330-92 (Ch. Div. 1995)).
73. Dale, 734 A.2d at 1206 (citing Dale, No. MON-C-330-92, at 6, 38-40).
74. Dale, 734 A.2d at 1206 (citing Dale, No. MON-C-330-92, at 71).
75. Dale v. Boy Scouts of Am., 308 N.J. Super. 516 (App. Div. 1998).
76. Id.
77. Id. at 549-50.
78. Dale, 734 A.2d at 1207-18.
79. Id. at 1208 (quoting Fuchilla v. Layman, 109 N.J. 319, 334 (N.J. 1988) (quoting Jackson v. Concord Co.,
54 N.J. 113, 124 (N.J. 1969))).
80. Dale, 734 A.2d at 1207-08 (quoting N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-4 (West 1993)).
81. Dale 734A.2d at 1209-13.
82. Id. at 1218 (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-4 (1993)).
83. Dale, 734A.2d at 1219-1228.
84. Id. at 1219-1222.
85. Id. at 1221.
2000]
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could join, and there was no upper limit on the number of new members.8 The
purpose of each troop was "'to produce inclusive, not exclusive membership,"'
-- one that represented the entire population." This was accomplished through
special advertising and solicitation programs. 8 In addition, each troop often
invited nonmembers to attend meetings and other activities.9 Thus, there was
nothing to indicate that the Boy Scouts was a private and exclusive organization
to trigger a protected right of intimate association."
Somewhat more difficult was the determination of whether the Boy Scouts'
freedom of expressive association had been violated. After careful analysis, the
court decided that the application of New Jersey law did not amount to a consti-
tutional violation, because it did not adversely affect each member's ability to
join with one another to espouse their common message, which was not impaired
by Dale's membership." The Boy Scouts vigorously argued that based on its
Scout Law and Oath, it was bound to respect and uphold certain moral principles
that were completely opposed to homosexuality.92 In particular, it maintained
that a scout's duty to be "morally straight" and "clean" made it self-evident that
the Boy Scouts viewed homosexuality as immoral. 3 The Boy Scouts taught
those principles to its members as an essential part of its message.' To admit a
homosexual, it argued, would completely eviscerate those moral principles to
which it held so true.95
Nonetheless, the New Jersey Supreme Court solidly rejected these
contentions.9 6 It stated that the Boy Scouts did not join together to advance a
common message that homosexuality was immoral, but rather, to simply express
"a belief in moral values" and "encourage the moral development of its mem-
bers."97 A review of both the Scout Oath and Law made it apparent that the
duties to be "morally straight" and "clean" were not specifically connected to
homosexuality.9 8 In fact, neither the Scout Oath or Law expressly stated anything
about sexuality, or the immorality of homosexuality. Instead, "morally straight"
and "clean" appeared to prescribe a duty to simply be a good person: To have
respect for others, to be honest, faithful, thoughtful, and clean in the sense of not
being mean-spirited toward others, or using profanity or cruel language directed
at racial groups or those with physical or mental limitations.9 Neither did this
imply that homosexuality was immoral.10 Evidence showed that the Boy Scouts'
86. Id.
87. Id. at 1222 (quoting Board of Dirs. of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537, 546 (1987)).
88. Dale, 734 A.2d at 1221.
89. Id. at 1222.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 1222-28.




96. Id. at 1223-25.
97. Id. at 1223.
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religious sponsors differed in their views toward homosexuality.101 Thus, Dale's
membership would not, in any way, hinder the other members in their common
pursuit to live honorably, set high standards for themselves, and serve others.
02
In fact, Dale himself was equally committed to attaining these goals.0 3
Consequently, the court held that Dale was expelled not because his membership
conflicted with this message, but merely because of his status as a homosexual."'
The court also emphasized the "compelling interest of this State to eliminate
the destructive consequences of discrimination from our society," as an important
policy which was advanced by the New Jersey statute.0 Revealing the fact that
prejudice and intolerance have led victims of discrimination to be shut off "from
full participation in the social, economic, and political life of our country," the
court found a necessity, in the spirit of democracy and equality, to shield these
victims from such egregious conduct. ' This protection equally extended to
those subject to discrimination based on sexual orientation, who suffered just as
much hardship as those historically discriminated against based on other classifi-
cations such as race or sex.'"" Moreover, the statute fulfilled this compelling pol-
icy without any reference to one's viewpoint. 8 Even if admitting Dale slightly
infringed on the Boy Scouts' right of association, such an infringement was war-
ranted and outweighed by this paramount concern of New Jersey.'I
B. Curran v. Mount Diablo Council of Boy Scouts of America
In sheer contrast, the California case of Curran v. Mount Diablo Council of
Boy Scouts ofAmerica presents a very similar set of facts and issues, yet with a
completely different result. "' The final disposition of the case was decided just
one year prior to Dale."' Timothy Curran, like Dale, had an untarnished reputa-
tion and aspired to be a scout leader."2 He wanted to be an adult troop leader
and made his intention known to the Mount Diablo Council, a scouting organiza-
tion in northern California, after he had openly and publicly acknowledged his
homosexuality to the local press." 3 In addition, he made it clear that part of the
reason he sought to be a scout leader was to convey his pride in being gay and
the message that there was nothing wrong with it."' The Council informed
101. Id. at 1224-25.
102. Id. at 1225.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 1225-26.
105. Id. at 1227.
106. Id. at 1227-28.
107. Id. at 1227 (citing Dale v. Boy Scouts of Am., 318 N.J. Super. 516, 549 (App. Div. 1998)).
108. Dale, 734 A.2d at 1228.
109. Id. 734 A.2d at 1228 (citing Board of Dirs. of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537, 549
(1987)).
110. Curran v. Mount Diablo Council of Boy Scourts of Am., 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d 580 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994);
Curran v. Mount Diablo Council of the Boy Scouts of Am., 952 P.2d 218 (Cal. 1998).
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Curran that he would not be approved as an adult leader because his open
embrace of homosexuality would conflict with the Boy Scouts' standards for role
models and leaders."'
Curran brought suit under the Unruh Act, which prohibited discrimination in
"business establishments." ' 5 The trial court first held that the Boy Scouts was a
"business establishment" under the Act, since a "business" broadly included any
organization unless it was a small, intimate or private club.1" Because the
Council had about 13,500 scouts in its district, lacked selectivity in membership,
and had "public orientation and prominence in the community," it was unable to
establish that it was a small private club and therefore escaped the reach of the
Unruh Act. "5 The court then held that to apply the Act to require the Boy Scouts
to accept Curran as scout leader would violate its freedom of association,
because it would gravely interfere with its expressive activities."' Specifically,
the court found that the Boy Scouts had historically and traditionally regarded
homosexuality as immoral behavior, and excluding Curran was essential to
defend this belief.'20 To do otherwise would adversely impact its ability to
express its message. '21
The appellate court's decision, for purposes of the First Amendment issue, was
the most important part of the litigation."' The court of appeals first considered
whether the Boy Scouts' freedom of expressive association was at risk of being
curtailed.' It emphasized that this right was a fundamental liberty that
"assumes a group of like-minded individuals associating for the purposes of pro-
moting shared ideas, values and philosophies," may identify the people that make
up that association, and restrict it to those people only.'24 The court of appeals
declared that a law that substantially interfered with this right was unconstitu-
tional, and accordingly, that Curran's membership in the scouts would amount to
an intrusive and significant violation. 2 '
The court opined that a close look at the viewpoints and beliefs of the Boy
Scouts would reveal the "expressive voice of its members."'28 It disagreed with
the contention that an examination should be made of the beliefs of individual
members, because "the expressions of the group are the expressions of the mem-
bers."'27 With this in mind, the court found that the Boy Scouts, as an organiza-
tion, had a well-established and unequivocal belief that homosexuality was
immoral and inharmonious with the requirements that a scout be "morally
115. Id.
116. Id. at 582; CAL. CIV. CODE § 51 (West 1982).
117. Curran, 29 Cal Rptr. 2d at 583.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 583-84.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 584-98.
123. Id. at 584-93.
124. Id. at 586 (citing Democratic Party of U.S. v. Wisconsin, 450 U.S. 107, 122 (1981)).
125. Curran, 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 586.
126. Id. at 587.
127. Id. at 587-88.
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straight" and "clean. ' '' 28 The court based this finding largely on the un-contra-
dicted testimony of various members that this was always their common under-
standing of the organization's general belief to which they pledged to adhere. '29
Consequently, the court held that Curran's inclusion as a scout leader and a
role model would completely interfere with the expressive activities of the Boy
Scouts. 1 30 In doing so, the court focused on the effect that Curran's message
would have on the other members, particularly the younger ones.' 31 It deter-
mined that in light of Curran's position as a leader, counselor, teacher, and role
model, his advocacy and support of homosexuality would invade upon the scout
members' principles. 32 This would create the real possibility that these members
would be affected, and perhaps even inspired, to believe in the morality of homo-
sexuality and to engage in such conduct.33 By looking up to Curran as an adult
figure, it seemed quite conceivable to the court that the younger scouts would
begin to question their own sexual mores and behavior and that this would ulti-
mately "break apart the moral compact that holds together scouting's close asso-
ciations with traditional religions that believe homosexuality is immoral.' 34
Hence, the court determined that Curran was not excluded simply because of
his status as a homosexual, as the Dale court decided, but rather, "because he
was a model and advocate of the homosexual lifestyle."'35 He was excluded
because of his message and its underlying conduct.136 Once again, the court
made it clear that it was the effect on the young members that was so impor-
tant.1
37
Additionally, and contrary to Dale, the court of appeals did not give credence
to the idea that any interference with the Boy Scouts' freedom of expressive asso-
ciation was justified by California's compelling interest in eliminating discrimi-
nation in business establishments." Under the Unruh Act, the court found that
this interest was not as broad as it may have seemed.'39 Instead, California's
objective was to enable everyone to have an equal opportunity to enjoy economic
or commercial advantages, such as through business or employment relation-
ships, as well as the social benefits of public accommodations. ' But outside of
the commercial context, this interest did not apply.1 ' The court found that the
Boy Scouts did not provide any form of economic or business incentive to its
members, nor did it function as a traditional public accommodation.4 Rather,
128. Id. at 588.
129. Id. at 588-89.
130. Id. at 589-93.
131. Id. at 590- 9 1.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 591.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 591-92.
137. Id. at 592.
138. Id. at 593-95.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 594.
141. ld. at 593-94.
142. Id.
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the organization was established simply to provide its members with a sense of
"interpersonal association" through a set of common values.' In this context,
there could be no "compelling interest in ensuring equal access to such advan-
tages as business and professional opportunities and skills," because no such
advantages were at stake."' Moreover, the court felt that every act of discrimina-
tion could not automatically give rise to a compelling state interest, because the
interest in "personal dignity cannot be considered compelling in the abstract."'
4 5
The harms caused by everyday acts of prejudice cannot always be regulated by
the state. '"
Finally, the court held that the Unruh Act could not be applied to regulate
Mount Diablo Council's conduct, because it was not a "business establish-
ment."'"7 It noted that the organization had no business or commercial purpose,
nor did it offer a traditional public accommodation, distinguishing it from Rotary
and Jaycees."4 8 Instead, it viewed the Boy Scouts as a charitable organization
whose success and attraction did not depend on its profit or any identifiable out-
ward characteristics of its location, but on "the sense of community among its
participants.""' Furthermore, and in contrast to Dale, the court held that enforc-
ing the Unruh Act against the Boy Scouts would violate its right of private asso-
ciation, because the troops were "small, intimate, primary groups where the rela-
tionships can be characterized as continuous, close and personal.""50 In particu-
lar, each troop was comprised of patrols with between twelve and thirty boys, a
scoutmaster and assistant scoutmaster."' Each troop had the common purpose of
teaching values to its members and was selective in different ways. All members
had to abide by the Scout Oath and Law and each member chose which troop to
join, often on "a pre-existing personal affinity."'5 2 Within each troop, the rela-
tionships were "personal and intimate."' 53 Thus, the court held that to apply the
statute would interfere with these personal relationships.'
On appeal, the California Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeal's deci-
sion.' However, it did not consider the issue of freedom of association, but
based its decision solely on the determination that the Boy Scouts was not a
"business establishment" under the Unruh Act.'" Nevertheless, the decision cast
a final blow to Curran and others similarly situated.
143. Id. at 594 (quoting Welsh v. Boy Scouts of Am., 787 F Supp. 1511, 1540 (N.D. Il. 1992)).
144. Curran, 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 594.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 596-602.
148. Id. at 599-602.
149. Id. (quoting Welsh v. Boy Scouts of Am., 787 F. Supp. 1511, 1539 (N.D. 111. 1992)).
150. Curran, 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 597-98.




155. Curran v. Mount Diablo Council of the Boy Scouts of Am., 952 P.2d 218 (Cal. 1998).
156. Id. at 236.
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IV COMING To A RESOLUTION
On January 14, 2000, the United States Supreme Court decided to consider
Dale."57 While one can predict what the outcome will be, the Court nonetheless
faces a myriad of questions which, for the most part, remain unanswered and dif-
ficult to resolve. Dale and Curran both make this very clear, and certainly, in
resolving them, any court would face a daunting task.
A. Intimate Association
Perhaps the least discernible issue presented by these cases is whether or not
the Boy Scouts has a protected right of intimate association. Jaycees made it
clear that only those relationships that are characterized by small size, selectivity
and private seclusion, and that involve a sense of "deep attachments and commit-
ments," merit constitutional protection.1 58 The Dale court's finding that the Boy
Scouts lacks those essential components was quite convincing.5 9 The fact that
it-like the Jaycees and Rotary-attempts to reach out to a broad segment of the
community for membership, and invites nonmembers to its meetings and activi-
ties weighs against the Boy Scouts. This characteristic clearly refutes the exclu-
sive nature that Jaycees found so crucial. Similarly, when the court looks at the
Boy Scouts as one organization, the size is enormous, numbering well into the
millions worldwide.lW
At the same time, the question of "size" is also vague. It is not clear whether
this determination must be made by analysis of the organization as a whole, or
based on the individual troop, whose membership may be as few as eight, and
limited to no more than thirty.""1 Arguably, this constitutes a "small size" under
Jaycees. However, Dale considered this to be a "large size," noting in particular
that the Court in Rotary Club specifically decided that a club with only twenty
members was too much.1"2 Yet, on the other hand, the Curran majority felt that a
size of three to eight boys was "undeniably small."'" Does this mean that "small
size" is confined to groups with less than twenty members? Ten? Should consti-
tutional protection turn on such an arbitrary "headcount"?
Additionally, another problem is determining how selective the Boy Scouts
must be. The only visible requirements are age, citizenship, and adherence to a
belief in God, the Scout Oath and the Scout Law.' Apart from this, the Boy
Scouts does not appear very selective. ' The Dale majority obviously agreed,
157. Tony Mauro, High Court to test Boy Scouts'claim of First Amendment right to exclude gay, FREEDOM
FORUM (Jan. 19, 2000) <http://www.freedomforum.orglspeechl2000/il/9sctboyscouts.asp>.
158. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 619-20 (1984).
159. Dale v. Boy Scouts of Am., 734 A.2d 1196, 1219-22 (N.J. 1999).
160. Paul Varela, A Scout is Friendly: Freedom of Association an'd the State Effort to End Private
Discrimination, 30 WM & MARY L. REv. 919, 939 (1989).
161. Id.
162. Dale, 734 A.2d at 1221.
163. Curran v. Mount Diablo Council of the Boy Scouts of Am., 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d 580, 598 (Cal. App. 2 Dist.
1994).
164. Goodman, supra note 5, at 877.
165. Id.
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finding that any boy within the required age group could join, and that member-
ship was rarely denied. 166 On the other hand, Curran deems these requirements
to establish selectivity." A related argument is that because the scouts share per-
sonal experiences, a set of values and beliefs, and close friendships, all while
engaging in activities together, they share a common bond that satisfies Jaycee's
sense of "deep attachments and commitments."1' Whether or not this type of
personal affiliation justifies constitutional protection is also uncertain.
B. Expressive Association
Determining whether or not inclusion of a homosexual would destroy the Boy
Scouts' freedom of expressive association remains a troublesome and perplexing
issue. To make matters more difficult, Dale and Curran not only come to oppo-
site conclusions on this issue, but appear to approach it in somewhat different
ways.
1. Focusing on the common purpose and goal as the "message."
The Dale majority focused on the real message behind the Boy Scouts, and in
particular, what the members were collectively trying to achieve.6 9 In doing so,
the court strictly interpreted the meanings of "morally straight" and "clean" from
the Scout Oath and Law, and found that no reference or implication to sexuality
or homosexuality was made. 7 In essence, Dale requires the Boy Scouts to prove
that one of the core reasons that all of the members join together is to espouse
the message that homosexuality is immoral.17' While subconsciously, this might
be one purpose of the Boy Scouts, the ultimate purpose seems to be to promote
good moral values. It seems highly unlikely that a prospective scout would
desire to join the Boy Scouts out of a motivation to share and advocate his view
that homosexuality is immoral.
Dale s analysis also appears to be consistent with Jaycees, which emphasized
that the focus should be whether the forced inclusion will "impair the ability of
the original members to express only those views that brought them together."''
This could not then include any view that is merely incidental or subsidiary to
that essential common purpose. Moreover, in order to succeed, the Boy Scouts
must prove that "including homosexuals undermines its expressive purpose." '
In Dale, the Boy Scouts failed to show that Dale's inclusion would compromise
its common purpose of being righteous and virtuous, and therefore failed to sat-
isfy Jaycee's impairment test.' What also seems quite relevant to the Dale
determination is the fact that Dale himself aspired to attain these goals as any
166. Dale, 734 A.2d at 1221.
167. Curran, 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 598.
168. Varela, supra note 160, at 940; Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 619-20 (1984).
169. Dale, 734 A.2d at 1222-25.
170. Id. at 1224.
171. Id.
172. Jaycees, 468 U.S. at 623 (emphasis added).
173. Goodman, supra note 5, at 880.
174. Dale, 734 A.2d at 1223-25.
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other scout member would. "5 Thus, the motivation of the person seeking mem-
bership appears to play a role, especially where that person seeks to join in pur-
suit of the same goal as the other members of that organization.
2. Focusing on the organization's views and beliefs as the "message."
Curran, on the other hand, appeared to focus not so much on the purpose
behind scout membership, but on the common beliefs and ideals of the scouts,
and the effect on these common beliefs and ideals of admitting a homosexual
scout leader. "' The court was concerned with the threat a homosexual role
model and advocate would impose to his younger counterparts, who could con-
ceivably start to question their own beliefs and values about sexuality. " " In
essence, admitting Curran would tear apart the mutual bond between the scouts
that had existed since its inception, a shared set of values that was an essential
part of their identity.
By focusing on the effect on the Boy Scouts' shared values and beliefs, howev-
er, the court appears to have widened the scope of expressive association.
Jaycees seemed to stand for the proposition that the group's expressive purpose
had to be undermined, and not necessarily every belief or view that was associat-
ed with that purpose.'78 Certainly, some men in Jaycees may have had disfavor-
able views toward women, but this did not mean, as the Court found, that they
could not achieve the purposes for which their organization was formed."'
Similarly, regardless of what the Boy Scouts believes about homosexuality, this is
not necessarily connected with its ability to convey a message to be kind or good.
While the scouts' anti-homosexual beliefs might be at stake, Curran does not
seem to establish this crucial connection between those beliefs and its ultimate
purpose. Moreover, under Curran ' analysis, an organization may argue that the
inclusion of someone it dislikes would have an undesired effect on its beliefs,
thus violating its right of expressive association, even if the purpose for which it
was formed remains unscathed.
On the other hand, adherence to these ideals is arguably indispensable to the
success of the Boy Scouts, because a scout leader acts as a role model and the
driving force that brings the scouts together for their expressive purpose. 'I If the
leader urges a position that is opposed to those ideals, the strength of the Boy
Scouts could be severely eroded, and its ability to join together and engage in a
common pursuit could be impaired.'' Thus, the effect an admission has on
ideals might be relevant, especially when it has such long-term consequences,
and when the motivation of the applicant is to advocate and teach a view that is
antithetical to the "moral compact."'82
175. Id. at 1225.
176. Curran v. Mount Diablo Council of the Boy Scouts of Am., 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d 580, 589-93 (Cal. App. 2
Dist. 1994).
177. Id.
178. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
179. Id. at 627.
180. Id.
181. Varela, supra note 160, at 946-47.
182. Curran, 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 593.
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C. Association or Equality?
Perhaps the most arduous question facing the courts after Dale and Curran is
whether a strong and legitimate interest of the state to end discrimination man-
dates the admission of a homosexual, even if that would impair the Boy Scouts'
expressive pursuit. The Dale court felt that such an infringement would be justi-
fied in light of "the destructive consequences of discrimination" in today's soci-
ety and the need to adhere to a fundamental principle of equality.1" Curran, on
the other hand, did not agree that the state had an overriding interest to curb dis-
crimination outside the commercial context.18'
This difference may be attributed to the fact that the New Jersey statute
focused on the "the underlying problems we face as a society"'85 and sought to
eradicate discrimination based on sexual orientation in general to prevent the
"stigmatizing injury" and "personal hardship" it produced. 86 The California
statute was more confined to protecting the business and commercial interests of
homosexuals, and not necessarily every personal or moral interest that could be
gained socially.87 In essence, there are two competing state interests involved."
The first is to ensure "equal access to the goods and services" of the organiza-
tion, and the second is to eradicate "the 'stigmatizing injury' that results from
exclusionary policies based on 'archaic and overbroad assumptions about the rel-
ative needs and capacities' of the excluded individual.'"
It is not clear what the Court finds to be the important state interest. If the
interest is to insure equal opportunity to goods and services, then arguably, the
state has no compelling interest to prohibit the Boy Scouts from discriminating
based on sexual orientation. The Boy Scouts is not an organization that engages
in business arrangements nor provides any employment opportunities, economic
advantages, or services to the public. This feature raises the question of whether
the Boy Scouts is a place of public accommodation or a business organization. 90
However, if the state's purpose is to put an end to discrimination based on sexual
orientation in society, the Boy Scouts is subject to regulation, because its policy
of exclusion results in a serious social and personal harm to the individual.
Even if the Court finds a compelling state interest with regard to the Boy
Scouts' discriminatory exclusion of homosexuals, the question remains whether
the policy of equal access and opportunity that is so fundamental to our democ-
racy outweighs the important constitutional right of association. This question
may be the most difficult of all, and one that the Court is not ready to answer. It
is difficult to weigh the important interest in eradicating hate within our society
against the equally forceful desire to preserve freedom of association.
183. Dale v. Boy Scouts of Am., 734 A.2d 1196, 1227 (N.J. 1999).
184. Curran, 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 593.
185. Dale, 734 A.2d at 1227 n.15.
186. Id. (quoting Dale v. Boy Scouts of Am., 308 N.J. Super. 516, 549 (App. Div. 1998)).
187. Dale, 308 N.J. at 593-95.
188. Id.
189. Goodman, supra note 5, at 883 (quoting Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 625 (1984)).
190. See Dale, 734 A.2d at 1207-18; Curran, 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 596-602.
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Nevertheless, it is a critical issue that will have significant consequences not only
to the Boy Scouts, but also to countless private organizations all over the country
in the years to come.
V POSTSCRIPT
On June 28, 2000, the Supreme Court of the United States, in a dramatic opin-
ion delivered by Chief Justice Rehnquist and joined by Justices 0' Connor,
Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas, reversed the decision of the New Jersey Supreme
Court and held that the application of New Jersey's public accommodations law
would do violence to the Boy Scouts' right of expressive association."' The
majority concluded that the presence of Dale would interfere with the Boy
Scout's choice not to propound a point of view contrary to its beliefs."' In doing
so, the Court focused on the sincerely held beliefs and values claimed by the Boy
Scouts and accepted them as true, rather than attempt to independently ascertain
what the "true message" behind the Boy Scouts really was."93 It strongly differed
with the New Jersey's court's approach in finding that the Boy Scout's views con-
flicted with its ultimate purpose, saying that "it is not the role of the courts to
reject a group's expressed values because they disagree with those values or find
them internally inconsistent."9'
Accordingly, in giving such deference to what the Boy Scouts avowed as its
true expression, the Court found that to allow Dale to remain in the Boy Scouts
would "force the organization to send a message, both to the youth members and
the world, that the Boy Scouts accepts homosexual conduct as a legitimate form
of behavior."'9 5 In sharp contrast to the reasoning of the New Jersey court, the
Court stated that "associations do not have to associate for the 'purpose' of dis-
seminating a certain message in order to be entitled to the protections of the First
Amendment. An association must merely engage in expressive activity that
could be impaired in order to be entitled to protection."'9 8
The Court used Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of
Boston, Inc. as an analogy 9 Just as the Court there had determined that the
presence of an Irish-American gay, lesbian and bisexual group in a parade would
interfere with the parade organizer's choice not to express a particular view,
regardless of the fact that the overarching goal of the parade was not to express
any view about homosexuals, the Court similarly felt that Dale's presence would
191. Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 120 S. Ct. 2446, 2446-58 (2000).
192. Id. at 2454.
193. Id. at 2453. Note that the Court emphasized the fact that the Boy Scouts had always (and consistently)
maintained its position regarding homosexuals, and cited Curran v. Mt. Diablo Council of Boy Scouts of
America as an example of this consistency.
194. Id. at 2452.
195. Id. at 2454.
196. Id.
197. Id. (citing Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc., 515 U.S. 557
(1995)).
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be completely incompatible with the values instilled in the Boy Scouts, even if
the main purpose behind it was not to advocate against homosexual conduct." 8
Finally, the Court addressed the issue of whether the state's compelling interest
in eradicating discrimination justified an infringement on the Boy Scout's right
of expressive association.'99 While conceding that the Court had previously
determined that states have a significant interest in preventing discrimination
through the use of public accommodation laws, it noted that in those cases,
enforcement of these laws did not "materially interfere with the ideas that the
organization sought to express.""2 ° The majority distinguished the case before
them as one where enforcing the anti-discrimination statute would actually
thwart the organization's choice to express those ideals: To "retain Dale as an
assistant scoutmaster would significantly burden the organization's right to
oppose or disfavor homosexual conduct. '2' In light of this distinction, the Court
concluded that New Jersey's interests in ending discrimination did not warrant
such an infringement on the Boy Scout's First Amendment right.
On the other hand, Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Souter, Ginsberg, and
Breyer in dissent, felt that the majority's interpretation of the right of expressive
association was too broad. 02 Like the New Jersey Supreme Court, the dissent
took the position that the right of expressive association could not simply rest on
any form of expressive activity or policy, but rather, on a mutually common pur-
pose. 0 ' In turn, it was only when enforcement of the anti-discrimination law
seriously impaired that shared purpose that the right of expressive association
would be violated. ' The dissent strongly questioned the majority's position that
the court must defer to the organization's contention concerning its form of
expression.10 Instead, the dissent would make the independent inquiry of
whether the organization is actually expressing a clear and unmistakable message
that would be impeded by enforcing the statute.06 It warned that to defer to any
viewpoint claimed by the organization as its innate expression would be tanta-
mount to "[s]hielding a litigant's claim from judicial scrutiny," and would conse-
quently "render civil rights legislation a nullity ... .2"" The dissent found, there-
fore, that the Boy Scouts did not express such a clear message that would be
infringed upon by the New Jersey statute.2°
198. Id. at 2454-55 (The Court declared that "[tihe fact that the organization does not trumpet its views from
the housetops, or that it tolerates dissent within its ranks, does not mean that its views receive no First
Amendment protection.").
199. Id. at 2455-58.
200. Id. at 2456 (citing Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 104 S. Ct. 3244 (1984); Board of Dirs. of Rotary
Int'l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537 (1987)).
201. Id. at 2457.
202. Id. at 2468-2472.
203. Id. at 2469.
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205. Id. at 2470.
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Both the majority and dissenting opinions appear to represent the split in the
approach to resolving whether an organization's right of expressive association is
violated. The ultimate question is whether one must look for an underlying
group message that would be seriously burdened, or simply defer to the organiza-
tion's "internal" values and beliefs and protect them from any interference? One
must also ask whether, to be constitutionally protected under the First
Amendment, it is sufficient to say that an organization need not be required to
collectively convey a certain message, but instead, need only partake in some
form of expressive activity. If so, then the repercussions of this decision could
be significant. Our efforts to break down the wall of discrimination could be
suppressed by a reinforced right of expressive association, broadly defined by
any conceivable ideas or beliefs within the organization, regardless of how rele-
vant or material they may be to the ultimate purpose of that group.

